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Evaluation of decision trees in which imprecise information prevails is complicated. Especially
when the tree has some depth, i.e. consists of more than one level, the eﬀects of the choice of repre-
sentation and evaluation procedures are signiﬁcant. Second-order representation and evaluation
may signiﬁcantly increase a decision-maker’s understanding of a decision situation when handling
aggregations of imprecise representations, as is the case in decision trees or inﬂuence diagrams, while
the use of only ﬁrst-order results gives an incomplete picture. Furthermore, due to the eﬀects on the
distribution of belief over the intervals of expected utilities, the C-maximin decision rule seems to be
unnecessarily pessimistic as the belief in neighbourhoods of points near interval boundaries is usually
lower than in neighbourhoods near the centre. Due to this, a generalized expected utility is proposed.
The results in this paper apply also to approaches, which do not explicitly deal with second-order
information, such as standard decision trees or probabilistic networks using only ﬁrst-order con-
cepts, for example upper and lower bounds. Furthermore, the results also apply to other, non-
probabilistic weighted trees such as multi-criteria weight trees.
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In decision analysis, whether for agents or human decision-makers, it is often the case that
complete, adequate, and precise information is missing. The requirement to provide numer-
ically precise information in such models has often been considered unrealistic in real-life
decision situations. Consequently, during recent decades of rather intense activities within
the decision analysis community (see, e.g., [1–3] for overviews) several approaches have
emerged. In particular, ﬁrst-order approaches, i.e. suggestions based on sets of probability
measures, upper and lower probabilities, and interval probabilities, have prevailed. As a rep-
resentation, they have been successful in research and have gained acceptance among deci-
sion-makers. In evaluation of decision models, though, they often result in overlapping
expected utilities because they are not able to use all information available in the decision
model. That is the ﬁrst reason to study second-order approaches. Sometimes, the deci-
sion-maker has an idea on the distribution of belief within intervals given. First-order rep-
resentations do not admit for discrimination between diﬀerent beliefs in diﬀerent values of
the decision parameters. This seems unnecessarily restrictive since a decision-maker does
not necessarily believe with the same faith in all possible functions that the parameter vectors
represent, i.e. in all points between the upper and lower bounds. That is the second reason to
study second-order approaches. Furthermore, eﬀects only evident from a second-order anal-
ysis may lead to warped evaluation results not discovered with an upper and lower bound
analysis even in cases where a decision-maker originally does not discriminate between dif-
ferent beliefs. That is the third reason to study second-order approaches. By discussing eval-
uations based on expected utility, these reasons will be explored.
To allow for more eﬃcient modelling of the decision-maker’s beliefs, representations of
decision situations could involve beliefs in sets of epistemically possible probability and
utility functions as well as relations between them. Beliefs of such kinds can be expressed
using higher-order belief distributions. However, they have usually been dismissed for var-
ious reasons, conceptual and computational, and approaches based on sets of probability
measures, upper and lower probabilities, or interval probabilities have traditionally been
preferred. We demonstrate in this paper why second-order reasoning is useful and how
information eﬃciency can be taken into account also when handling aggregations of
ﬁrst-order representations as they occur in decision trees or probabilistic networks. This
paper handles probabilistic single-criterion decision trees. While not explicitly treated here,
the same eﬀects occur in multi-criteria weight trees. Interval weights are likewise normal-
ized (i.e. adding up to 1) and are amenable to the same eﬀects as interval probabilities.
This paper will initially consider the representation of decision information. The repre-
sentation is discussed from two viewpoints, structure and constraints. Thereafter, the eval-
uation of decision trees is discussed in two steps. First, interval probabilities are introduced.
Next, additional belief information is considered, and the sum of weighted values is handled,
where the values are, for instance, utilities. The belief can (but need not) be second-order
probabilities. This is a general framework where probabilities and utilities as presented
below is a special case closely connected to probabilistic decision trees and networks.
2. Representation
Decisions under risk (probabilistic decisions) are often given a tree representation, cf.
[4]. In this paper, we let a decision frame represent a decision problem. The idea with such
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sentational issues are of two kinds, structure and constraints (statements).
2.1. Tree structure
One of the building blocks of a frame is a decision tree. Formally, a decision tree is a
graph.
Deﬁnition 1. A graph is a structure hV,Ei where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of
node pairs (edges). A tree is a connected graph without cycles. A rooted tree is a tree with
a dedicated node as a root. The root is at level 0. The adjacent nodes, except for the nodes
at level i  1, to a node at level i is at level i + 1. A node at level i is a leaf if it has no
adjacent nodes at level i + 1. A node at level i + 1 that is adjacent to a node at level i is a
child of the latter. A (sub-)tree is symmetric if all nodes at level i have the same number of
adjacent nodes at level i + 1. The depth of a rooted tree is max(n|there exists a node at level
n).
A general graph structure is, however, too permissive for representing a decision tree.
Hence, we will restrict the possible degrees of freedom of expression in the decision tree.
Deﬁnition 2. A decision tree T = hC [ A [ N [ {r},Ei is a tree where
• r is the root;
• A is the set of nodes at level 1;
• C is the set of leaves;
• N is the set of intermediary nodes in the tree except these in A;
• E is the set of node pairs (edges) connecting nodes at adjacent levels.A decision tree is a way of modelling a decision situation where A is the set of alterna-
tives and C is the set of ﬁnal consequences. For convenience we can, for instance, use the
notation that the n children of a node xi are denoted, xi1,xi2, . . . ,xin and the m children of
the node xij are denoted xij1,xij2, . . . ,xijm, etc.
In a decision tree structure, the edges can be considered to be events, and thus be
assigned probability variables.1 Likewise, the leaves can be considered to be consequence
nodes and be assigned utility variables (Fig. 1).
2.2. Constraints
Constraints are ﬁrst-order decision-maker information and structural information that
delimit the solution spaces of the probability and utility variables. There are two sources
for constraints, the ﬁrst source being decision-maker statements of probabilities and
utilities. The statements are translated into corresponding constraints. Such constraints
can either be range constraints (containing only one variable) or various kinds of compar-
ative constraints. Given consequences ci, cj, ck, and cm, denote their probabilities pi, pj, pk,1 Even the edge from an alternative can be considered an event with a probability in {0,1}.
Fig. 1. A decision tree.
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lowing kinds for real numbers a1, a2, d1, d2, d3, and d4:
• Range constraints: ‘‘vi is between a1 and a2’’ is denoted vi 2 [a1,a2] and translated into
viP a1 and vi 6 a2. Similarly for probabilities, ‘‘pi is between b1 and b2’’ is denoted
pi 2 [b1,b2] and translated into piP b1 and pi 6 b2.
• Comparative constraints: Several possibilities; examples include ‘‘the diﬀerence between
vi and vj is between d1 and d2’’ is denoted vi  vj 2 [d1,d2] and translated into vi  vjP d1
and vi  vj 6 d2. ‘‘The diﬀerence between vi  vj and vk  vm is between d3 and d4’’ is
denoted (vi  vj)  (vk  vm) 2 [d3,d4] and translated into (vi + vm)  (vj + vk)P d3
and (vi + vm)  (vj + vk) 6 d4.
Constraints of the form vi/vjP a1 are of interest for some applications. Such constraints
depend on the utilities being deﬁned on a ratio scale. This paper deals with constraints
applicable to all cardinal utility scales, but the results are equally applicable to decision
situations with quotient expressions on a ratio scale. The other source for constraints is
implicit constraints. They emerge either from properties of the variables or from structural
dependencies. Such constraints can either be default constraints (involving a single vari-
able) or various kinds of structural constraints (involving more than one variable).
• Default constraints: A value scale range of vi from s to t is expressed as vi 2 [s, t] and
translated into viP s and vi 6 t.
• Structural constraints: For each parent node xi with children xij, the normalization con-
straint for probabilities is
P
jpij ¼ 1.
Combining these two sources, constraint sets are obtained. A constraint set can either
be independent (containing only constraints involving a single variable each), or it can be
dependent (also containing constraints involving more than one variable).
Deﬁnition 3. Given a decision tree T, let P be a set of constraints in the variables
{p. . . i . . . j . . .}. Substitute the intermediate node labels x. . . i . . . j . . . with p. . . i . . . j . . .. P is a
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p. . .i that are not leaves, the statements p. . . ij 2 [0, 1] and
P
jp... ij ¼ 1; j 2 ½1; . . . ;m...i are in
P, where m. . .i is the number of sub-nodes to p. . .i.
Thus, a probability constraint set relative to a decision tree can be seen as characteriz-
ing a set of discrete probability distributions, i.e. belief in discrete probabilities associated
with, for example, edges in decision trees. Normalization constraints (
P
jpij ¼ 1) require
the probabilities of sets of exhaustive and mutually exclusive nodes to sum to one.
Deﬁnition 4. Given a decision tree T, let V be a set of constraints in {v. . .j}. Substitute the
leaf labels x. . . j with v. . . j. Then V is a utility constraint set for T.
Similar to a probability constraint set, a utility constraint set can be seen as character-
izing a set of utility functions. In this paper, we will without loss of generality assume
that the utility variables’ ranges are [0,1]. The elements above can be combined to create
a decision frame, which constitutes a complete ﬁrst-order description of the decision
situation.
Deﬁnition 5. A decision frame is a structure hT,P,Vi, where T is a decision tree, P is a
probability constraint set for T, and V is a utility constraint set for T.
Thus, a decision frame combines structure with ﬁrst-order constraints.
2.3. Beliefs
Approaches for extending interval representations by using distributions over classes of
probability and utility measures have been developed into various hierarchical models
such as second-order probability theory [5–8]. Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin consider global dis-
tributions of beliefs but restrict themselves to the probability case and to interval represen-
tations. Furthermore, they neither investigate the relation between global and local
distributions, nor do they introduce methods for determining the consistency of
user-asserted sentences [9]. The same criticism applies to [10–12].
To facilitate a better qualiﬁcation of the various possible functions, second-order esti-
mates, such as distributions expressing various beliefs, can be introduced over an n-dimen-
sional space where each dimension corresponds to possible probabilities of events or
utilities of consequences.
Deﬁnition 6. Let a unit cube be represented by B = [0,1]k. A belief distribution over B is a
positive distribution F deﬁned on B such that
Z
B
F ðxÞdV bðxÞ ¼ 1
where VB is a k-dimensional Lebesgue measure on B. The set of all belief distributions over
B is denoted by BD(B). In some cases, we will denote a unit cube by (b1, . . . ,bk) to make
the number of dimensions and the labels of the dimensions clearer.
In this way, the distributions can be used to express varying strengths of belief in dif-
ferent ﬁrst-order probability or utility vectors.
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f ðx1; x2Þ ¼
3ðx21 þ x22Þ if 1P x2 P x1 P 0
0 otherwise

represents beliefs in diﬀerent vectors (x1,x2). The volume under the graph of this function
is 1.Example 2. The functions f:b1! b1 and h:b2! b2 are belief distributions over the one-
dimensional unit cubes (b1) and (b2), respectively deﬁned by
f ðx1Þ ¼ maxð0;minð100x1 þ 20; 100x1ÞÞ
and
hðx2Þ ¼ max 0;min  100
3
x2 þ 80
3
;
200
3
x2  100
3
  
:
These have graphs given by triangles with bases on the x1-axis and the x2-axis, respec-
tively, and with areas = 1. Therefore, g(x1,x2) = f(x1) Æ h(x2) is a belief distribution over
a unit cube (b1,b2).
In a ﬁrst-order representation, the belief is expressed only as an interval with no qual-
iﬁcation within the interval. Thus, the decision-maker believes in points within the interval
and does not believe in points outside of it. Sometimes, ﬁrst-order information is the only
information available, sometimes there is more. It is important to be able to model all
information available, whether only ﬁrst-order or also second-order.
2.4. Local distributions
Second-order information available in a given decision situation is often local over sub-
sets of lower dimensions (most decision-makers are unable to perceive their global beliefs
over, say, a 100-dimensional cube). An important issue is therefore to investigate the rela-
tionship between diﬀerent types of distributions. A reasonable semantics for this relation-
ship, i.e. what do beliefs over some subset of a unit cube mean with respect to beliefs over
the entire cube, is provided by summing up all possible belief values of the vectors with
some components ﬁxed. This is captured by the concept of S-projections.
Deﬁnition 7. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bk) and A = (bi1, . . . ,bis), ij 2 {1, . . . ,k} be unit cubes. Let
F 2 BD(B), and let
fAðxÞ ¼
Z
BnA
F ðxÞdV BnAðxÞ:
Then fA is the S-projection of F on A. This projection is denoted fA = projA(F).
Thus, an S-projection of a belief distribution is also a belief distribution. A special case
of projection is when belief distributions over the axes of a unit cube B are S-projections of
a belief distribution over B.
Deﬁnition 8. Given a unit cube B = (b1, . . . ,bk) and a distribution F 2 BD(B). Then the
distribution fi(xi) obtained by
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Z
Bi
F ðxÞdV BiðxÞ
where Bi ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bi1; biþ1; . . . ; bkÞ is a belief distribution over the bi-axis. Such a dis-
tribution will be referred to as a local distribution.2
The rationale behind local distributions is that the resulting belief in, e.g., the point 0.1
is, in a sense, the sum of all beliefs over the vectors where 0.1 is the ﬁrst component, i.e. the
totality of belief in this point.
Example 3. Let a unit cube be given. Assume that the vectors in this cube are represented
by pairs. Each of these pairs is assigned a belief, e.g., g(0.1,0.4) = 0.2, g(0.1,0.7) = 0.3, etc.Example 4. Given a unit cube [0,1]3 with positive uniform belief on the surface whereP3
i¼1xi ¼ 1, the S-projection f(xi) on the axes is f(xi) = 2  2xi, i.e.
f ðxiÞ ¼
Z 1xi
0
2ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
dy ¼ 2 2xi
In a ﬁrst-order representation, belief cannot be assigned to speciﬁc points or sets of
points within intervals. Thus, it seems that the decision-maker has to implicitly believe
in the same way in all points within the upper and lower bounds. In Example 4, the bounds
for each variable correspond to the interval [0,1]. But it is mathematically impossible to
believe equally in the entire range due to the warp eﬀect. This eﬀect will be discussed in
Section 3.2.5. Centroids
Intuitively, the centroid of a distribution is a point in space where some of the geomet-
rical properties of the distribution can be regarded as concentrated. This is, in some
respects, analogous to the centre of mass of physical bodies. The centroid will turn out
to be a good representative of the distribution in expected utility calculations.
Deﬁnition 9. Given a belief distribution F over a cube B, the centroid Fc of F is
F c ¼
Z
B
xF ðxÞdV BðxÞ
where VB is some k-dimensional Lebesgue measure on B.
Centroids are invariant under projections on subsets of the unit cubes in the sense that
the S-projections of a centroid on a subset have the same coordinates as the centroids of
the corresponding S-projections [8]. Thus, a local distribution of a belief distribution pre-
serves the centroid in that dimension.2 Note that belief is more general than second-order probability. For the special case when the belief
distributions are second-order probability distributions, global distributions would be called joint distributions
and local distributions would be called marginal distributions. Similarly, centroids (deﬁned in the next section)
would be called expectations.
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fc ¼
Z 1
0
x  ð2 2xÞdx ¼ 1
3
i.e. the center of mass in an ordinary triangle.
In Example 4 above, the upper and lower ﬁrst-order bounds correspond to the interval
[0,1]. The midpoint of the interval, 0.5, is not a good single-point representative of the
decision-maker’s belief. The vector (0.5,0.5,0.5) is not even consistent with the normaliza-
tion constraint.
The second-order information is collected together with ﬁrst-order information (from
the previously deﬁned decision frame) into a composite frame holding all information con-
nected to a particular decision situation. We will, in the sequel, use the notation of a gen-
eral decision frame hT,P*,V*i as a (ﬁrst-order) decision frame hT,P,Vi augmented with
second-order information (global distributions or sets of local distributions) over the prob-
abilities and utilities in P and V, respectively.
3. Evaluation
In the basic model of Bayesian decision analysis, a decision-maker has to choose an
alternative (action) from a non-empty, ﬁnite setA ¼ fA1; . . . ; Ang of possible alternatives.
Each alternative may end up in a ﬁnite set of consequences, and the resulting consequence
of each alternative depends on the true (but probably unknown) state of nature
h 2 H = {h1, . . . ,hi, . . . ,hk}. The corresponding outcome is then evaluated by means of a
utility function u satisfying
uðAHÞ ! R
ðA; hÞ7!uðA; hÞ
Since the true state of nature is unknown, the model asserts the knowledge of the proba-
bility distribution P(Æ) on ðH;PoðHÞÞ where PoðHÞ is the power set of H. The most com-
mon selection procedure is referred to as the principle of maximizing the expected utility
(PMEU), and is argued for in [14] and [15]. It is implied from widely accepted axiom sys-
tems deﬁning formal models of rationality. Other selection procedures, for example
thresholds and regret functions, are discussed in [20]. In PMEU, the alternative A to prefer
is the alternative which maximizes the expected utility for all Ai 2A.
Deﬁnition 10. The principle of maximizing the expected utility is accepted if a decision-
making agent chooses the alternative A* from a set A whenever
A ¼ arg max
A
ðEðAÞÞ
where
EðAÞ ¼
X
h2H
uðA; hÞ  P ðhÞ
for all A 2A.
A preference ordering relation  on A is implied from the magnitudes of the diﬀerent
alternatives’ expected utility.
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An important relation in Bayesian decision analysis is Ai  Aj () E(Ai)P E(Aj) for
any two alternatives Ai;Aj 2A. This relation is useful if complete, adequate, and precise
information is available. In many real-life decision situations, this is not the case. As a con-
sequence, much work in the decision analysis community has been focused on developing
models and frameworks handling imprecision. Some well-known approaches are based on
upper and lower probabilities [16], sets of probability measures [17,18], and interval prob-
abilities [3]. For instance, generalizations of probability and utility estimates can straight-
forwardly be expressed by the following.
Deﬁnition 11. Given a ﬁnite sample space H and a r-ﬁeld C of random events in H, the
probability P(hi) of state hi is expressed as the variable pi bounded by the following
constraints
sup P ðhiÞ ¼ 1 inf P ð:hiÞX
hi2H
pi ¼ 1Deﬁnition 12. Let L be a set of mappings L ¼ fuðAHÞ ! ½0; 1g where all u 2 L are
increasing. Given a subset U  L such that uij = {u(Ai,hj):u 2 U} is a closed interval, then
the interval-valued utilities are deﬁned in terms of the closed intervals uij.
The expected utility of the alternatives represented by a classical decision tree are
straightforwardly calculated when all components are numerically precise. When the
domains of the terms are solution sets to probability and utility constraint sets, this is not
as straightforward, but there are eﬃcient methods available [19,20]. The probability and
utility constraint sets are collections of linear inequalities. A minimal requirement for such
a system of inequalities to bemeaningful is that it is consistent, i.e. there must be some vector
of variable assignments that simultaneously satisﬁes each inequality in the system.
The ﬁrst step in an evaluation procedure is to calculate the meaningful (consistent) con-
straint sets in the sense above. Ensuing consistency, the primary evaluation rule for a deci-
sion tree model is based on a generalized expected utility. Since neither probabilities nor
utilities are ﬁxed numbers, evaluation of the expected utility yields multi-linear objective
functions.
Deﬁnition 13. Given a decision frame hT,P,Vi, GEV(Ai) denotes the generalized expected
utility of alternative Ai and is obtained from
Xni0
i1¼1
pii1
Xni1
i2¼1
pii1i2 . . .
Xnim2
im1¼1
pii1i2:::im2im1 . . .
Xnim1
im¼1
pii1i2:::im2im1im  vii1i2:::im2im1im
where p...ij... ; j 2 ½1; . . . ; m, denote probability variables in P, v...ij... denote utility variables
in V, and nij is the number of children nodes of the node at depth j.
Methods for evaluating GEV in imprecise domains mainly involve ﬁnding lower and
upper bounds on expected utilities in decision trees. Optimisation of non-linear expres-
sions, such as the expected utility, subject to linear constraints (the probability and utility
constraint sets) are computationally demanding problems to solve for an interactive or
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linear programming. In, e.g., [13,24,25] there are discussions about computational proce-
dures that reduce such non-linear decision evaluation problems to systems with linear
objective functions, solvable with ordinary linear programming methods. The procedures
yield interval estimates of the evaluations, i.e. upper and lower bounds of the expected util-
ities for the alternatives, yielding interval-valued expected utilities to be compared. How-
ever, when trying to compare the expected utility intervals directly, many decision
situations will lead only to a partial preference order onA since the intervals are overlap-
ping. Due to this complication, some authors suggest the C-maximin3 principle [21–23] for
evaluation of interval-valued decision problems.
Deﬁnition 14. The C-maximin principle is accepted if a decision-making agent chooses the
alternative A* from a set A whenever
A ¼ argmax
A
ðinfðEðAÞÞÞ
where
inf EðAÞ ¼ inf
X
h2H
uðA; hÞ  P ðhÞ
for all A 2A.
However, this is quite a pessimistic decision rule, disregarding much of the information
present in the decision model. Below we will present what we consider a more balanced
and information eﬃcient candidate.
Other decision rules available are based on the concept of admissibility or derivations
thereof [20]. The common denominator is that the rules consider some combination of
upper and lower bounds of the expected utility. Such a ﬁrst-order rule based procedure
is a ﬁrst step in an interval decision analysis, but it cannot really solve the overlap situa-
tion. More can be done, however, using the information available if the evaluation contin-
ues with second-order (belief) analyses.
3.2. Belief evaluation
Belief evaluation in decision trees proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, global belief is
generated from local belief. Global belief distributions are obtained by multiplying the local
belief distributions as explained below. In the second step, the global belief is used in
obtaining the expected utility by term-wise multiplication with the belief in utilities and sub-
sequent summation of the generated terms. In the ﬁnal step, the alternatives are analysed
using the belief information. Below, we will in separate subsections discuss the three steps.
There are three major kinds of second-order analysis (the third step). In a centroid anal-
yses, the centroid is employed as a single-point representative of the distributions. The rep-
resentatives are compared in order to generate a preference order on the alternatives. In a
contraction analysis, the centroid is employed in a generalisation of interval analysis in
which the ﬁrst-order intervals are contracted by a procedure allowing points closer to
the centroid to be emphasized in the evaluation [13]. In a distribution analysis, the resulting3 When loss functions are used instead of utility functions, the rule is labelled C-minimax.
M. Danielson et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 46 (2007) 387–407 397distributions of expected utility are compared by assessing the fractions of belief overlap-
ping between alternatives being evaluated.
3.3. Global probability belief
Obtaining global belief from local is the ﬁrst step in a belief evaluation. It corresponds
to generating global probability variables qijk from a multiplication of local probability
variables pi Æ pij Æ pijk in a ﬁrst-order analysis. Let G be a belief distribution over the two
cubes A and B. Assuming that G has a positive support on the feasible probability distri-
butions at level i in a decision tree, i.e. is representing them (the support of G in cube A), as
well as on the feasible probability distributions of the children of a node xij, i.e. xij1,
xij2, . . . ,xijm (the support of G in cube B). Let f = projA(G) and g = projB(G) as in Deﬁni-
tion 7. Then the functions f and g are belief distributions according to [7]. Furthermore,
there are no relations between two probabilities at diﬀerent levels (having diﬀerent parent
nodes) so the distributions f and g are independent. Consequently, the following combina-
tion rule for the distribution over the product of the distributions f and g has a well-
deﬁned semantics, i.e. it expresses a convolution of two densities which is the density of
the product under an independence assumption.
Deﬁnition 15. The cumulative distribution H of a product of two belief distributions f(x)
and g(y) is
HðzÞ ¼
Z Z
Cz
f ðxÞgðyÞdxdy ¼
Z 1
0
Z z=x
0
f ðxÞgðyÞdy dx ¼
Z 1
0
f ðxÞG z
x
 
dx
¼
Z 1
z
f ðxÞG z
x
 
dx
where G is the antiderivative of g, Cz = {(x,y):x Æ y = z}, and 0 6 z 6 1. Let h(z) be the cor-
responding density function. Then
hðzÞ ¼ d
dz
Z 1
z
f ðxÞG z
x
 
dx ¼
Z 1
z
f ðxÞgðzxÞ
x
dx
Let us now consider the relation to traditional (ﬁrst-order) interval calculus. When
aggregating interval probabilities and utilities in a tree as above, there are two main classes
of belief distributions to consider, centred and non-centred.
• Centred: Belief distributions with at least as much mass toward the centre as toward the
boundaries. Examples include triangular, trapezoid, uniform, and bell-shaped
distributions.
• Non-centred: Belief distributions with less mass toward the centre than toward the
boundaries. Examples include convex and bimodal distributions.
The uniform distribution is the limiting case of the centred class, having an equal dis-
tribution of belief mass over the interval. The centred class contains most implicit distri-
butions, i.e. when there is no explicit information on the distribution of belief. If there is
explicit information on, e.g., the belief in only boundary points, then the distribution will
belong to the non-centred class. In Theorems 1 and 2 below, we will discuss the warp eﬀect
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uniform distribution. The eﬀect is still highly visible. Most other centred distributions are
more aﬀected, e.g. symmetric distributions.
Theorem 1. Let f1(x1), . . . , fm(xm) be independent uniform belief distributions over the
intervals [0,1]. The product hm(zm) over these m factors is the distribution
hmðzmÞ ¼ ð1Þ
m1ðlnðzmÞÞm1
CðmÞ
where C(m) = (m  1)! is the Euler Gamma function.Proof. By induction:
h1ðz1Þ ¼ ð1Þ
11ðlnðz1ÞÞ11
Cð1Þ ¼ 1 ð1Þ
hmþ1ðzmþ1Þ ¼
Z 1
zmþ1
hmðxÞfmþ1ðzmþ1x Þ
x
dx
¼
Z 1
zmþ1
ð1Þm1ðlnðxÞÞm1
ðm 1Þ!
x
dx
¼ ð1Þ
mðlnðzmþ1ÞÞm
ðmÞ! ð2Þ
h
The example shows the distributions at increasing levels of depth. The warp eﬀect can
be clearly seen as the distributions tend to lower values in deeper trees. The interval
boundaries are still [0,1] for all distributions. This illustrates that ﬁrst-order information
does not give the complete picture.
Example 6. The distributions hm(zm) in Theorem 1 are belief distributions, and Fig. 2
below shows, from right to left, the plots of the functions of depth 2–7, i.e.
 lnðxÞ; ln2ðxÞ2 ; ln
3ðxÞ
6 ;
ln4ðxÞ
24 ;
ln5ðxÞ
120 ;
ln6ðxÞ
720 .
An important property of the distribution above is its centroid. It experiences the same
warp eﬀect, tending to lower values as the level of depth increases.
Theorem 2. The centroid of the distribution hm(zm) in Theorem 1 is 2
m.ProofZ 1
0
zm
ð1Þm1ðlnðzmÞÞm1
CðmÞ dzm ¼
ð1Þm1
CðmÞ
Z 1
0
zmðlnðzmÞÞm1dzm
¼ ð1Þ
m1
CðmÞ 
1
2
 m 
CðmÞ ¼ 2m 
Fig. 2. Multiplication of distributions of 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 consecutive node values.
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become more concentrated to the lower values the deeper the tree is and, as a consequence,
the centroid tends towards lower values. Already after one multiplication, this eﬀect is sig-
niﬁcant. This is called the warp eﬀect. It should be regarded as additional information by
any method employing an interval calculus of weights (such as probabilities or multi-cri-
teria weights). As mentioned above, these eﬀects are not dependent on the use of uniform
distributions. Rather, they are even more emphasized for most other centre-focused (e.g.
triangular or bell-shaped) belief distributions. For this reason, belief evaluation is impor-
tant also for decision problems containing only ﬁrst-order statements.3.4. Belief in expected utility
Obtaining the belief in expected utilities from global belief is the second step in a belief
evaluation. It consists of two sub-steps, ﬁrst multiplying belief in global probability and
utility, and then adding all the multiplied belief. In a ﬁrst-order analysis, the ﬁrst sub-step
corresponds to multiplying global probability variables qijk with utility variables uijk. The
second sub-step corresponds to adding the multiplied terms qijk Æ uijk.
Let BV = [0,1]
k be a unit cube with an associated belief distribution F. The local distri-
butions fi(xi) can be calculated through the concept of S-projections. Then the following
rule for the distribution over a sum has well-deﬁned semantics.
Deﬁnition 16. The distribution h2 on a sum y2 = x1 + x2 of two independent variables
associated with belief distributions f1(x1) and f2(x2) is given by a convolution
h2ðy2Þ ¼
Z 1
1
f1ðx1Þf2ðy2  x1Þdx1:
When letting yk = x1+   +xk the belief distribution hk(yk) on the sum yk ¼
Pk
i¼1xi is
obtained by induction applying Deﬁnition 16.
Centroids are preserved under projections, in the sense that the centroid of an S-projec-
tion of F on A  imF share coordinates with the centroid of F [8]. Thus, a local distribu-
tion of a belief distribution preserves the centroid in that dimension. From [8], it is clear
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dent variables x and y with centroids fc and gc, the centroid of the distribution on their
product x Æ y is given by fc Æ gc. An equally important property is that the centroid is addi-
tive as well.
Lemma 1. The horizontal centroid hc of h, where h is defined as in Definition 16, is the sum of
the horizontal centroids of each fi, i.e. the horizontal centroid is additive.Proof. This follows directly from the property of convolution in which the horizontal cen-
troid adds. h
When calculating expected utilities, each term is a product of a probability and a utility.
From this reasoning, the following rule for the distribution over the line segment of pos-
sible expected utilities follows.
Deﬁnition 17. Given a probability unit cube BP ¼ ðp1; . . . ; pkÞ;
P
ipi ¼ 1, and a utility unit
cube BV = (u1, . . . ,uk), an expected utility unit cube, denoted BEU, is the cross product
BEU = BP · BV.Thus, given any point e = (p1,u1,p2,u2, . . . ,pk,uk) 2 BEU, there is an expected utility
z 2 [0,1] such that z = p1 Æ u1 + p2 Æ u2 +  + pk Æ uk whenever
Pk
i¼1pi ¼ 1.
Deﬁnition 18. Let hT,P*,V*i be a general decision frame. The function h(z) on a sum
z ¼Pki¼1piui of a set of products of two variables fpi  uigki¼1, associated with global belief
distributions F(p1, . . . ,pk) and G(u1, . . . ,uk) in hT,P*,V*i, is obtained by evaluating the
integralhðzÞ ¼
Z
Sz
F ðpÞGðuÞdSzðp; uÞ
where Sz ¼ fðp1; u1; . . . ; pk; ukÞ : z ¼
Pk
i¼1pi  uig  ½0; 12k, 0 6 z 6 1, and dSz(p,u) is the
surface area element.4Lemma 2. Let hT,P*,V*i be a general decision frame. The function h(z) in Definition 18 is a
belief distribution.Proof. Since
R
BEU
jF ðpÞGðuÞjdV BEUðp; uÞ < 1, applying Fubini’s theorem yieldsZ 1
0
hðzÞdz ¼
Z 1
0
Z
Sz
F ðpÞGðuÞdSzðp; uÞ
 
dz ¼
Z
BEU
F ðpÞGðuÞdV BEUðp; uÞ
¼
Z
BP
F ðpÞdV BP ðpÞ
  Z
BV
GðuÞdV BV ðuÞ
 
¼ 1  1 4 In this deﬁnition we use p to denote the vector components (p1, . . . ,pk) which is a subset of the vector
components included in e = (p1,u1, . . . ,pk,uk). The same denotation applies to the vector u.
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where h is defined as in Definition 18, is the sum of the centroid products fic  gic , i.e. the
horizontal centroid is additive and multiplicative.Proof. Let F c ¼ ðp1c ; p2c ; . . . ; pkcÞ 2 BP and let Gc ¼ ðu1c ; u2c ; . . . ; ukcÞ 2 BV . Then we haveZ
BP
piF ðpÞdV ðpiÞdV ðp2Þ; . . . ; dV ðpkÞ ¼ pic
and analogously
Z
BV
uiGðuÞdV ðuiÞdV ðu2Þ; . . . ; dV ðukÞ ¼ uic :
Since F and G are independentZ
BEU
piF ðpÞ  uiGðuÞdV BPdV BV ¼ pi  ui:
Consequently hc ¼
Pk
i¼1ficgic . h
This makes the centroid attractive for evaluation purposes. The centroid of the expected
utility is composed from the component centroids in a straightforward manner.3.5. Example of belief in expected utility
The following illustrative example deals with an expected utility calculation where
H = {h1,h2}, i.e. there are only two uncertain outcomes. This example is provided to give
a geometrical understanding of belief in a decision situation. The belief is uniformly dis-
tributed over all possible probability and utility distributions. In this case we have two
two-dimensional unit cubes, BV = (u1,u2) and BP = (p1,p2). Over BV the belief distribution
is G(u) = 1 since the belief is uniformly distributed. Regarding BP, the belief distribution
over the surface p1 + p2 = 1 is F ðpÞ ¼ 1ﬃﬃ2p (this surface is a line with length
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
). Through
the transformation ðp1; p2Þ ¼ P ðpÞ ¼ pﬃﬃ2p ;
ﬃﬃ
2
p
pﬃﬃ
2
p
 
; 0 6 p 6
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
, BP may be replaced with
the line segment ½0; ﬃﬃﬃ2p .
Consider the three-dimensional space obtained by BV  ½0;
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p . In this space, each vec-
tor of points (p,u1,u2) now represents a possible expected utility. Given any point in this
space there is an expected utility z 2 [0, 1] such that pﬃﬃ
2
p u1 þ
ﬃﬃ
2
p
pﬃﬃ
2
p u2 ¼ z. The belief in a given
z is then obtained by summing up all beliefs of the vectors in the space ½0; 12  ½0; ﬃﬃﬃ2p 
which satisfy z ¼ pﬃﬃ
2
p u1 þ
ﬃﬃ
2
p
pﬃﬃ
2
p u2 (Figs. 3 and 4).
According to Deﬁnition 18, the belief in a particular z is derived from the area of each
such surface when the component distributions are uniform. For z = 0 and z = 1, the sur-
face will have an area of zero, and the cumulative belief distribution of z is given by the
volume bounded by the surface Sz and the planes where p ¼ 0; u1 ¼ 0; u2 ¼ 0; p ¼ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
; u1 ¼ 1; u2 ¼ 1 weighted by F ðpÞGðuÞ ¼ 1ﬃﬃ2p . It can be shown that this cumulative
distribution H2(z) is
Fig. 3. Surface of points satisfying z ¼ 1
4
.
Fig. 4. Surface of points satisfying z ¼ 1
2
.
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Hence
h2ðzÞ ¼ d
dz
H 2ðzÞ ¼ 2ðz 1Þ lnð1 zÞ  2z lnðzÞ
and
Z 1
0
2ðz 1Þ lnð1 zÞ  2z lnðzÞdz ¼ 1:
Fig. 5. Belief distribution h2(z) where z 2 [0,1] is an expected utility.
Fig. 6. Decision matrix with three alternatives and two uncertain states.
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concave. The belief in expected utility becomes centroid-focused compared to the compo-
nent-wise initial beliefs in probability and utility (Fig. 5).
3.6. Decision rules
Making a decision based on a decision rule is the third step in a belief evaluation. It
corresponds to applying a decision rule such as C-maximin in a ﬁrst-order evaluation.
To illustrate the need for a new decision rule within this framework, we will consider
the following decision situation under risk. In the decision matrix below, pij corresponds
to P(hj|Ai) and uij corresponds to u(hj|Ai) (Fig. 6).
To obtain a weak preference order on the three alternatives, one proposed candidate is
the C-maximin decision rule. Applying C-maximin will give us the order A3 	 A2 	 A1.
Thus, the decision-maker is obliged to choose A3 if accepting C-maximin.
Let z1, z2, and z3 be variables representing possible expected utilities of A1, A2, and A3,
respectively, and let h1(z1), h2(z2), and h3(z3) denote the belief distributions on the possible
expected utilities of each alternative. Through Monte Carlo simulations5 we obtain the
shapes of the belief distributions on the possible expected utilities. From Theorem 3, it
is clear that the horizontal centroid is additive, yielding5 Simulations performed with the software Crystal Ball, 300,000 trials.
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h2c ¼ 0:35 75þ 0:65 50 ¼ 58:75;
h3c ¼ 0:4 75þ 0:6 50 ¼ 60:
As can be seen in Figs. 7–9 below, when basing a decision on lower bounds (which is the
case in the C-maximin decision rule), the decision is based on points, which do not repre-
sent the decision-maker’s implicit belief in an adequate manner. Furthermore, since the
belief distributions over the expected utility intervals are not uniform, even in cases whereFig. 7. Belief distribution on z1.
Fig. 8. Belief distribution on z2.
Fig. 9. Belief distribution on z3.
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fact that belief, in the cases discussed in this paper, tend to concentrate in sub-intervals
containing the centroid.
In the light of the discussion above, basing a decision only on extreme points such as
lower bounds seems to be too conservative and unnecessarily pessimistic. If a weak pref-
erence order is desired (avoiding situations like, e.g., indecision or incomparability) the
following decision rule based on a generalized expected utility is suggested, which basically
can be described as the expected utility vector at the centroid of a belief distribution h as
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 18.
Deﬁnition 19. Let hT,P*,V*i be a general decision frame. The principle of maximizing the
generalized expected utility is accepted if a decision-making agent chooses the alternative
A* from h T,P*,V*i whenever
A ¼ argmax
A
ðGðAÞÞ
for all A 2A, where G(A) = hc as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 18.
This decision rule is a good candidate when the belief distributions have a major part of
the belief mass concentrated to some neighbourhood of each centroid. The variance of the
belief is a measure of appropriateness, where a high variance indicates the decision rule
being less appropriate. Furthermore, a centroid analysis is very attractive from a compu-
tational viewpoint due to the properties of the centroid. Note that applying this rule yields
the preference order A1 	 A3 	 A2 in the example given in this section. Needless to say, the
single-centroid decision rule may not be appropriate to employ in cases where the belief
distribution on the expected utility interval is convex, but due to the warp and summation
eﬀects, such situations are infrequent.
Compare the centroid based decision rule in Deﬁnition 19 to the pointwise rule in Def-
inition 10 and the lower bound rule in Deﬁnition 14. The pointwise rule is unable to handle
imprecision at all. While the lower bound rule tries to handle ﬁrst-order imprecision, it is a
very pessimistic rule. The centroid rule is a more balanced rule, handling ﬁrst-order as well
as second-order imprecision.
A further use of the centroid is in contraction analysis, a generalisation of ﬁrst-order
interval analysis in which the intervals are contracted towards a focal point by a procedure
allowing points closer to the focal point to be emphasized in the evaluation [13]. The focal
point is the single-point representative of each interval, and by using the centroid as the
focal point, second-order information is used to enhance the analysis.
As can be seen from the results above, in general, the eﬀects are considerable when eval-
uating imprecise decision problems. Inevitably, in a distribution analysis the most impor-
tant sub-intervals to consider are the supports of the distributions where the most mass is
concentrated. This can be compared to the ordinary (ﬁrst-order) multiplication of extreme
points (bounds) which would generate an interval without any more information. Conse-
quently, an important component in a distributional method for decision tree analysis is
the possibility of determining belief-dense sub-intervals.
These observations do not imply that the extreme points (interval boundaries) them-
selves are wrong, only that interval methods in general are unable to use all information
available. This does neither imply that algorithms for determining upper and lower bounds
in trees are inappropriate, but the results are incomplete and should be supplemented by
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complicated, the centroid is a very good candidate for practical purposes, either stand-
alone or in combination with contractions.
4. Conclusion
There are several reasons to look at second-order approaches for the eﬃcient use of
information in interval decision analysis. The key idea is to use the information available
in eﬃcient evaluation of decision structures. In this paper, we show eﬀects of employing
the principle of maximizing the expected utility using interval estimates and belief distri-
butions in decision trees. Using only interval estimates often does not provide enough dis-
crimination power to generate a preference order among alternatives considered. We have
demonstrated that second-order belief adds decision information when handling aggrega-
tions of interval representations, such as in decision trees or probabilistic networks, and
that interval estimates (upper and lower bounds) in themselves are incomplete. The han-
dling of second-order information can be amended to a ﬁrst-order tree model such as the
one suggested in this paper where a traditional decision frame is enlarged and the extended
model is handled by a set of well-deﬁned concepts. Interpreting probabilities as general
weights, the results also apply to other weighted structures such as multi-criteria weight
trees.
The results apply equally well to approaches, which do not explicitly deal with belief
distributions. Focusing only on ﬁrst-order concepts in evaluating decision situations does
not provide the complete picture. Second-order eﬀects are still present regardless of the
expressed or implied beliefs of the decision-maker. The rationale behind this fact is the
demonstration that multiplied distributions warp signiﬁcantly compared to their compo-
nent distributions. The multiplied (global belief) distributions concentrate their masses
towards the lower values compared to their component distributions. Furthermore, the
sum of utilities weighted by global belief concentrates around the centroids of the linear
combination of the centroid components.
There are essentially three ways of handling the eﬀects shown in this paper. The ﬁrst
way (centroid analysis) is to use the centroid as the best single-point representative of
the distributions. The centroid is additive and multiplicative. Thus, the centroid of the dis-
tribution of expected utility is the expected utility of the centroids of the projections. A
centroid analysis gives a good overview of a decision situation. The second way (contrac-
tion analysis) is to use the centroid as the focal point (contraction point) towards which
the intervals are decreased while studying the overlap in ﬁrst-order expected utility inter-
vals. The third way (distribution analysis) is more elaborated, involving the analysis of the
resulting distributions of expected utility and calculating the fraction of belief overlapping
between alternatives being evaluated.
References
[1] G.J. Klir, Uncertainty and information measures for imprecise probabilities: an overview, in: Proceedings of
the First International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications, 1999.
[2] A. Cano, S. Moral, A review of propagation algorithms for imprecise probabilities, in: Proceedings of the
First International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications, 1999.
[3] K. Weichselberger, The theory of interval-probability as a unifying concept for uncertainty, in: Proceedings
of the First International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications, 1999.
M. Danielson et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 46 (2007) 387–407 407[4] H. Raiﬀa, Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley, 1968.
[5] P. Ga¨rdenfors, N.-E. Sahlin, Unreliable probabilities risk taking and decision making, Synthese 53 (1982)
361–386.
[6] P. Ga¨rdenfors, N.-E. Sahlin, Decision making with unreliable probabilities, British Journal of Mathematical
and Statistical Psychology 36 (1983) 240–251.
[7] L. Ekenberg, J. Thorbio¨rnson, Second-Order Decision Analysis, International Journal of Uncertainty,
Fuzziness, and Knowledge-based Systems 9 (1) (2001) 13–38.
[8] L. Ekenberg, J. Thorbio¨rnson, T. Baidya, Value diﬀerences using second order distributions, International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning 38 (1) (2005) 81–97.
[9] L. Ekenberg, The logic of conﬂict between decision making agents, Journal of Logic and Computation 10 (4)
(2000) 583–602.
[10] J.L. Hodges, E.L. Lehmann, The Use of previous experience in reaching statistical decisions, The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics 23 (1952) 396–407.
[11] L. Hurwicz, Optimality criteria for decision making under ignorance, Cowles Commission Discussion Paper
370, 1951.
[12] A. Wald, Statistical Decision Functions, John Wiley & Sons, 1950.
[13] M. Danielson, Handling imperfect user statements in real-life decision analysis, International Journal of
Information Technology and Decision Making 3 (3) (2004) 513–534.
[14] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, second ed., Princeton
University Press, 1947.
[15] L.J. Savage, The Foundation of Statistics, second ed., John Wiley and Sons, 1972.
[16] A.P. Dempster, Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping, Annals of Mathematical
Statistics 38 (1967) 325–339.
[17] I. Levi, On indeterminate probabilities, Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974) 391–418.
[18] P. Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, Chapman and Hall, 1991.
[19] M. Danielson, L. Ekenberg, J. Johansson, A. Larsson, The DecideIT Decision Tool, in: Bernard, Seidenfeld,
Zaﬀalon (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their
Applications, 2003, pp. 204–217.
[20] M. Danielson, Generalized evaluation in decision analysis, European Journal of Operational Research 162
(2) (2005) 442–449.
[21] J.O. Berger, Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis, second ed., Springer, 1984.
[22] Th. Augustin, On decision making under ambiguous prior and sampling information, in: Proceedings of the
Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications, 2001.
[23] B. Vidakovic, C-minimax a paradigm for conservative Robust Bayesians, in: Insua, Ruggeri (Eds.), Robust
Bayesian Analysis, Springer, 2000.
[24] M. Danielson, L. Ekenberg, A framework for analysing decisions under risk, European Journal of
Operational Research 104 (3) (1998) 474–484.
[25] X.S. Ding, M. Danielson, L. Ekenberg, Non-linear Solvers for Decision Analysis, Selected Papers of the
International Conference on Operations Research (OR 2003), 2004, pp. 475–482.
